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A major feat of social beings is to encode what their conspecifics see, know or
believe. While various non-human animals show precursors of these abilities,
humans perform uniquely sophisticated inferences about other people’s
mental states. However, it is still unclear how these possibly human-specific
capacities develop andwhether preverbal infants, similarly to adults, form rep-
resentations of other agents’ mental states, specificallymetarepresentations.We
explored the neurocognitive bases of eight-month-olds’ ability to encode the
world from another person’s perspective, using gamma-band electroencepha-
lographic activity over the temporal lobes, an established neural signature for
sustained object representation after occlusion. We observed such gamma-
band activity when an object was occluded from the infants’ perspective, as
well as when it was occluded only from the other person (study 1), and also
when subsequently the object disappeared, but the person falsely believed
the object to be present (study 2). These findings suggest that the cognitive sys-
tems involved in representing theworld from infants’ own perspective are also
recruited for encoding others’ beliefs. Such results point to an early-developing,
powerful apparatus suitable to deal with multiple concurrent representations,
and suggest that infants can have a metarepresentational understanding of
other minds even before the onset of language.1. Introduction
Humans and other animals encode various aspects of theworld, allowing them to
successfully navigate their physical and social environment. What possibly sets
humans apart from other species is that they attribute mental states to other
people as representations of the environment that may be different from their
own representations. This ability is usually termed as theory ofmind and includes
reasoning about others’ mental states such as beliefs, goals or desires [1]. Theory
of mind capacities seem to emerge early in human development, and a growing
body of evidence suggests that infants can interpret others’ behaviourwith regard
to their mental states very early on [2,3], although the underlyingmechanisms are
still unclear.
Already in their first year of life, infants can predict others’ actions based on
their mental states [4], and at around 18 months of age, they can also modify
their own behaviour accordingly [5–7]. Such findings were taken as evidence
that infants attribute beliefs to others and represent these belief contents in the
form of metarepresentations (i.e. representations incorporating other represen-
tations) [8]. Other accounts, however, question the validity of the interpretation
of these studies in terms of mental state attributions, and suggest that instead
of ascribing mental representations to others, infants simply store object–agent
relations [9], form associations or apply behavioural rules [10]. Similar alterna-
tives were also raised with regard to non-human animals’ theory of mind
abilities [11]. Metarepresentations in general, and theory of mind or false belief
understanding in particular, have been argued to be absent in other species
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2than humans [12–14]. Thus, to understand the nature and ori-
gins of such abilities, it would be crucial to assess whether
prelinguistic creatures, specifically human infants attribute
representations to other people.
Different accounts emerged regarding how humans may
deal with metarepresentations used in language and in
mental state reasoning. Sperber [15] proposed that the most
cost-effective way for a cognitive system to handle them
would be if any representation could also serve as the content
of ametarepresentation. Leslie [8], in hiswork describing a cog-
nitive model of pretense (make-believe play observed in
toddlers, such as pretending that a banana is a telephone),
argues that in pretense the primary representation of an
object is copied into a ‘metarepresentational context’. Both
these proposals involve some form of ‘re-use’ of a primary rep-
resentation. The relation between a linguistic utterance as a
primary representation (e.g. ‘dogs can fly’) and a correspond-
ing metarepresentation (e.g. it is unlikely that ‘dogs can fly’)
may seem intuitive. However, it is unclear how such
embedded representations are implemented in the cognitive
architecture, how they are realized in case of non-linguistic rep-
resentations, andwhether the underlying mechanism could be
already present in preverbal infants.
Earlier research from the domain of action understanding
might provide useful insights regarding how the developing
cognitive system may deal with representations that regard
other people. Specifically, recent electrophysiological findings
suggest that infants recruit their motor system (as reflected by
decreased sensorimotor alpha-band oscillatory activation) not
only when they perform an action, but also during the obser-
vation and prediction of others’ actions [16]. In the domain of
theory of mind, behavioural evidence seems to point to an
analogous possibility. When infants or adults are exposed
to situations where they can track others’ perspective or
beliefs, their own representations and the representations
attributed to others seem to influence their reactions in analo-
gous ways [3,17]. For example, infants show surprise when
the outcome of an event does not match another agent’s
belief about the scene, similarly to their surprise if the outcome
contradicts their own knowledge [3]. These findings suggest
that the two representations may overlap, and are in line
with the proposal that a possible mechanism for infants (or
adults) to attribute representations to others would use
their own representational system that is otherwise used for
encoding objects and events in the world.
In this study, we build on this proposal: if infants ascribe a
representation to another person, say, about an object, they
would rely on their original representation, which would
then be used as the content of the mental state. This way
infants’ own representations of the environment and the
representations ascribed to others could be realized through
one cognitive system subserving both processes. If so, this
enables us to make predictions about the neural signatures of
processing ascribed representations. For example, if maintain-
ing a representation of an object, as a primary representation,
has a specific neural correlate in infants, we should observe a
similar neural activation also if infants process an object rep-
resentation they attribute to another person. To test these
questions, we exploit earlier paradigms that found a specific
brain signature accompanying object representations in
infants.
Infants possess powerful representational abilities to sus-
tain the representation of an object even if it is not visible tothem anymore. Kaufman et al. [18] found increased gamma-
band oscillatory activation in electroencephalographic (EEG)
responses over the temporal regions when six-month-old
infants witnessed the occlusion of an object, compared with
when the object disintegrated before occlusion. Similar acti-
vation was found when a hand began lifting an occluder
behind which an object had previously entered [19]. Together,
these findings suggest that the gamma-band activation sig-
nalled that infants actively sustained the representation of the
object, which they believed to be behind the occluder. Here,
we hypothesize that such activation may not only reflect pro-
cesses involved in how infants handle object representations
for themselves, but also signal computations required for
attributing a representation about an object to another person.
In two studies, we presented eight-month-old infants
with scenes involving an actor and an object, and recorded
event-related EEG activity during events involving the occlu-
sion of the object from the infants’ or the actor’s perspective.
An increase in gamma-band activation was predicted when
either the infant or the actor had to sustain the representation
of the object.2. Study 1
Study 1 explored eight-month-old infants’ understanding of a
scene where a person is attending to an object, which is then
occluded from her. We asked whether this event triggers an
attribution process that involves sustained object represen-
tations. In order to test this, we developed scenarios involving
occlusion events from multiple perspectives (figure 1). First, a
target object and an actor were shown on the screen, with the
object visible to both the infant and the actor. Then, the object
was occluded either fromonly the actor or also from the infant’s
view. In order to implement a dynamically changing visual
access to the object from multiple viewpoints, we placed the
object in a box that had two sides removed. By rotating the
box, the infant, the actor on the screen, neither or both could
see the object in question.We compared these events with scen-
arios where the box initially contained an object, but then the
object disintegrated while both the actor and the infants could
see this event. Therefore, the motion of the box was identical
in the two kinds of events, but in this latter case, the box did
not occlude an object from the actor’s or infant’s view (rather
just empty space).
On the basis of previous findings [18,19], we predicted
increased gamma-band activation during the occlusion of the
object from the infants’ view. Furthermore, we hypothesized
shared underlying mechanisms for sustaining an object rep-
resentation for the self and for another person. Therefore,
increased gamma-band oscillatory activity during occlusion
from the actor would suggest that infants encode that the
actor sustains the representation of the object while it is
occluded from her. We calculated the average EEG gamma-
band activation (25–35 Hz) over the left and right posterior
temporal regions specified by earlier studies targeting sus-
tained object representations in infancy [18,19], during
occlusion of the object from the actor’s or the infants’ view.
(a) Material and methods
(i) Participants
The final sample consisted of 15 full-term eight-month-old
infants (mean age ¼ 246.3 days; age range 236–255 days).
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Figure 1. Schematic of the events in study 1. (a) The first 1.5 s of each video were identical in the two conditions. (b) In the object present—occlusion condition
the object remained present, and was occluded by the rotating box, first from the actor’s point of view, then also from the infant. (c) In the object absent—
occlusion condition, the rotation of the box was identical but occluded an empty area from the actor’s and then the infant’s side. In both conditions, the trial ended
with the box completely turned away.
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3(ii) Stimuli
Two types of videos were used (corresponding to two
conditions). Both featured a female actor who looked at a rotat-
ing box open at two sides that contained an object. First, the
opening of the box was facing away for 200 ms, then it rotated
to reveal the object in 600 ms and stood still for 200 ms. Then,
the actor turned to the object for 600 ms. This was followed by
the object remaining present (object present—occlusion
condition; electronic supplementary material, video S1) or the
object disintegrating in 600 ms (object absent—occlusion con-
dition; electronic supplementary material, video S2). Following
a 300–500 ms (randomized length) still period, the box turned
further, occluding the object (object present—occlusion con-
dition) or an empty area (object absent—occlusion condition)
from the actor in 600 ms. After a 700–900 ms (randomized
length) still period, the box rotated again further and occluded
the object (object present—occlusion condition) or an empty
area (object absent—occlusion condition) also from the infant.
The trial endedwith an 800 ms still periodwith the box comple-
tely turned away (identical in the two conditions). For further
details regarding stimuli and procedure, see electronic
supplementary material, materials and methods.(iii) EEG recording and analysis
Continuous EEG was recorded using Hydrocel geodesic
sensor nets (Electrical Geodesics Inc., Eugene, OR) from 124
channels equally distributed on the scalp, referenced to the
vertex (Cz). The ground electrode was at the rear of the
head (between Cz and Pz). The sampling rate was 500 Hz
with a low-pass filter of 200 Hz. The EEG was segmented
into two types of segments of interest.
The first segment (occlusion from actor) was the part of
the video when, in the object present condition, the object
was gradually hidden from the actor due to the rotation of
the box, while the infants still saw it. In the object absent con-
dition, this segment included the identical movement of the
empty box. This segment was time-locked to the start of the
movement of the box, and lasted 1200 ms after rotation
onset, of which the rotation took place in the first 600 ms.
The baseline period for the occlusion from actor segment
was the 200 ms recording preceding the rotation of the occlu-
der. The second segment of interest (occlusion from infant)corresponded to the period when the object became gradu-
ally hidden from the infants. This segment was time-locked
to the start of the respective movement of the occluder and
had a length of 1200 ms. In the occlusion from infant seg-
ment, we used an epoch that roughly matched (due to a
jittered period after the occlusion from actor segment),
the baseline period in the first segment: a 200ms interval
ending 1500 ms before the onset of occlusion from infant
(for calculating this baseline period, see electronic
supplementary material, material and methods).
The EEGdatawere examined, and segmentswere excluded
if they were judged as not attended by the infant based on
the video recording, or contained artefacts as judged by the
automatic or manual artefact detection (for further details,
see electronic supplementary material, materials and
methods). After the time–frequency transformation performed
on the cleaned data, we compared oscillatory activity between
the two conditions over 5–5 channels in right (channels 97, 98,
102, 103, 109, positioned above channel T3 in the 10–20 system)
and left (channels 40, 41, 46, 47, 51, above channel T4 in the
10–20 system) temporal areas. Electrode sites were selected
based on previouswork byKaufman et al. [18,19].We analysed
the lower frequencies (25–35 Hz) of the gamma range, where
activation was most pronounced in earlier studies [19] for
our events of interest.(b) Results
First, we analysed gamma-band oscillatory activation
in the two segments separately, in two-way ANOVAs
withcondition (object present—occlusion versus object
absent—occlusion) and hemisphere (left versus right) as
within-subjects factors. To assess whether our results replicate
earlier findings on neural signatures of sustained object
representations, we analysed activation during the occlusion
from infant segment (segment 2). Analysis revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of condition (F1,14 ¼ 13.23, p ¼ 0.003, partial
h2 ¼ 0.49) due to significantly higher activation in the
occlusion (M ¼ 0.09 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.03), compared with object
absent—occlusion condition (M ¼ 20.07 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.04 mV;
figure 2b). There was no main effect of hemisphere, and no
interaction between condition and hemisphere (F1,14 ¼ 0.04,
p ¼ 0.81; and F1,14 ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 0.86).
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Figure 2. Time– frequency difference plots depicting average gamma-band oscillatory activation over the left and right posterior temporal cortex during the two
segments in study 1. Plots reflect mean activation difference between conditions; positive difference indicates higher activation in object present—occlusion con-
dition than in object absent—occlusion condition. In both segments, 0 ms marks the onset of the occlusion event; in the first segment (a) from the actor, in the
second segment (b) from the infant. Red rectangles indicate the time and frequency range over which statistics were computed.
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Figure 3. Mean activation in (a) study 1 during occlusion from actor and occlusion from infant, and (b) study 2 occlusion from actor at the target time windows
(550–650 ms), at five left (L) and five right (R) temporal electrodes in object present—occlusion (‘occlusion’) and object absent—occlusion (‘control’) conditions,
over the 25–35 Hz frequency range. Error bars represent standard errors.
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4We conducted a similar two-way ANOVA for the occlu-
sion from actor segment (segment 1), which revealed a
significant interaction between condition and hemisphere
(F1,14 ¼ 4.99, p ¼ 0.04, partial h2 ¼ 0.26), and a marginally
significant main effect of condition (F1,14 ¼ 4.53, p ¼ 0.052,
partial h2 ¼ 0.24). There was no effect of hemisphere
(F1,14 ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 0.81). To understand the interaction, we per-
formed separate t-tests for the two hemispheres. There was
no significant difference between conditions in the right
hemisphere, t14 ¼ 21.03, p ¼ 0.32. Importantly, there was a
significant difference in the left hemisphere (t14 ¼ 22.56,
p ¼ 0.023, r2 ¼ 0.32) due to higher gamma activation in the
object present—occlusion condition (M¼ 0.08 mV, s.e.¼
0.05 mV) than in the object absent—occlusion condition (M¼
20.12 mV, s.e.¼ 0.04 mV; figure 2a).
To assess whether the pattern of activation in the two seg-
ments was similar to each other, we analysed them together
in a repeated measure ANOVA with segment (occlusion
from actor versus occlusion from infant), condition (object
present—occlusion versus object absent—occlusion) and
hemisphere (left versus right) as within-subjects factors. We
found a significant main effect of condition (F1,14 ¼ 13.24,
p ¼ 0.003, partial h2 ¼ 0.49). No other main effect orinteraction was significant (for mean values in study 1, see
figure 3a). Thus, while in the occlusion from actor segment,
the effect was more pronounced on the left side, the direction
of activation in this segment was similar in the two hemi-
spheres and together they did not differ significantly from
that in the occlusion from infant segment.
In addition to analysing activation in our predicted time
windows, we observed a further activation within the same
frequency range in the occlusion from actor segment for the
1000–1100 ms period (figure 2a). When we analysed acti-
vation in this additional time window, we found a
marginally significant effect of condition in the left hemi-
sphere (t14 ¼ 22.07, p ¼ 0.057, r2 ¼ 0.23) with higher
activation in the object present—occlusion condition than in
the object absent—occlusion condition (M ¼ 0.09 mV, s.e. ¼
0.05 mV and M ¼ 20.11 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.07 mV, respectively). A
similar analysis did not yield any significant effects in the
right hemisphere and in the occlusion from infant segment.
While this late activation burst in occlusion from actor seg-
ment may signal a possible difference between processing
representations attributed to another agent and first person
representations, it was not predicted. We intended to confirm
this finding in study 2.
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5(c) Discussion
Our results from the occlusion from infant segment are in
linewith earlier evidence pointing to a signature of infants’ sus-
tained object representation [18,19]. Specifically, we observed
higher gamma-band activation over posterior temporal areas
when an object became occluded from the infants compared
with when there was no object present. Crucially, we observed
similar activation when the object became occluded from the
actor only (occlusion from actor). Note that in the occlusion
from actor segment the object was still visible to infants; there-
fore, they did not have to sustain the object representation from
their own perspective. This suggests that infants attributed a
sustained representation of the object to the actor when she
lost visual access to the object.
These results suggest that eight-month-old infants success-
fully computed the visual perspective of the actor regarding
the object, an ability that is rarely observed at such a young
age. Furthermore, while visual perspective taking (computing
whether an agent can see an object) is necessary, it may not be
sufficient to explain our findings. Taking the gamma-band
oscillatory activity at the time of occlusion as an indicator of
sustained object representation, infants in our study did not
only infer that the person no longer saw the object (as this
would also apply in the object absent-occlusion condition),
they also attributed to her the representation of the continued
existence of the object behind the occluder.
Identifying the mechanisms at play when infants attribute
a sustained object representation (a true belief ) to another
person allows further investigations of belief attribution pro-
cesses. If the activation found in study 1 accompanies events
involving attributed object representations, then it should be
present regardless of the veridicality of this representation
(i.e. even when the other person holds a false belief regarding
the object’s existence behind the occluder).3. Study 2
We developed a false belief scenario similar to the events in
study 1 (see electronic supplementary material, figure S1).
Eight-month-old infants were presented with the same initial
event inwhich the actor attended to an object. Then, in the criti-
cal condition, the object became occluded from the person
(segment 1; identical to segment 1 of study 1), and afterwards,
the object disintegrated (segment 2). This disintegration was
therefore visible to the infants but not to the actor; hence, this
event must have resulted in the actor’s false belief that the
object was still behind the occluder. The critical question was
whether infants would encode that the representation of the
object cannot be discarded on behalf of the actor but it must
be further sustained. Such an attribution processmight be indi-
cated by gamma-band activation during the disintegration
event that is seen only by the infant but not the actor.
(a) Material and methods
(i) Participants
The final sample consisted of 15 full-term eight-month-old
infants (mean age ¼ 245 days; range ¼ 229–261 days).
(ii) Stimuli
In study 2, the setting of the scenes and the initial part of the
videos (including the first segment of interest) was identicalto study 1. Then, in the object occluded—false belief con-
dition, the object was occluded from the actor by the
rotating box in 600 ms (occlusion from actor) and after a
still period of 600 ms, it disintegrated during 600 ms, while
only the infants and not the actor could see this event (elec-
tronic supplementary material, video S3). We will refer to
this disintegration period as a false belief event, because in
this case infants could note that the object ceased to exist
and was not present anymore, and could infer that the
actor should falsely believe it still to be present behind the
occluding side of the box. In the object absent—true belief
condition (electronic supplementary material, video S4), the
object disintegrated when the actor still saw the object, and
subsequently, the empty space was occluded in 600 ms. Fol-
lowing a 600 ms still period (during the corresponding
disintegration period of the object occluded—false belief con-
dition), in the object absent—true belief condition, the empty
box remained turned away from the actor for 600 ms. Thus,
the two conditions differed only in the timing of the disinte-
gration of the object: after (false belief) or before (true belief),
it was occluded from the actor. Finally, in both conditions,
the empty box rotated back towards the actor. Hence, infants
in study 2 never saw the object being occluded from them.
The rotation of the box was identical in the two conditions.
For further details regarding stimuli and procedure, see
electronic supplementary material, materials and methods.
(iii) EEG recording and analysis
Except for segmentation, EEG recording and analysis was
identical to that of study 1. Similarly to study 1, the first seg-
ment (occlusion from actor) was the part of the video when
the object was gradually hidden from the actor by the
rotation of the box (in the object occluded—false belief con-
dition), whereas the infants still saw it; or the identical
movement of the empty box (in the object absent—true
belief condition). Hence, in the occlusion from actor segment,
we specified the same time window of interest as in study 1,
and the baseline was again a 200ms interval finishing
1200 ms before the start of the segment.
The second segment of interest (false belief event) in
study 2 corresponded to the period when the object disinte-
grated after being occluded from the person (or the same
time period during the object absent—true belief condition)
and the subsequent still image. This period lasted 800 ms
and its start was time-locked to the start of disintegration
event. Similar to study 1, the baseline was a 200ms interval
finishing 1200 ms before the start of the segment (the same
baseline as for occlusion from actor). In this false belief seg-
ment, we analysed activation throughout the disintegration
event, from 1200 to 1800 ms, where 1200 ms corresponded
to the onset of the disintegration and 1800 ms to the time
point when the object had fully disappeared.
(b) Results
We calculated the average gamma-band activation (25–
35 Hz) the same way as in study 1 during two segments of
interest: occlusion from actor and false belief.
As direct comparison between the two segments was
not meaningful (one being an occlusion, which can be seen
as a discrete event, while the other is a disintegration with
a gradual temporal unfolding), activations in the two seg-
ments were analysed separately. A two-way ANOVA on
study 2 segment 2
false belief event
20
1000
object visible
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object disintegrates (actor
still believes it to be there)
1200 1400 1600
ms
1800 2000
25
30Hz
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0.5
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Figure 4. Time–frequency analysis of the average EEG during the false belief
event at 10 electrodes over the left and right temporal cortex in study 2. The
plot reflects mean activation difference between conditions; positive differ-
ence indicates higher activation in object occluded—false belief condition
than in object absent—true belief. 1200 ms is the onset of the disintegration
event and 1800 ms is the offset. The red rectangle indicates the time and
frequency range over which statistics were computed.
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6the occlusion from actor segment with condition (object
occluded—false belief versus object absent—true belief ) and
hemisphere (left versus right) as within-subjects factors
revealed a main effect of condition (F1,14 ¼ 5.98, p ¼ 0.03, par-
tial h2 ¼ 0.3). This effect was due to higher activation in the
object occluded—false belief condition (M ¼ 0.044 mV) than
in object absent—true belief (M ¼ 20.07 mV; figure 3b). No
other main effect or interaction emerged.
We then compared activation during occlusion from actor
in study 2 with that of study 1. These segments were identical
in the two studies and both depicted an occlusion from actor
event. A three-way mixed ANOVA was conducted with con-
dition (object present versus object absent) and hemisphere
(left versus right) as within-subjects factors, and study
(1 versus 2) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed
a main effect of condition (F1,28¼ 10.13, p ¼ 0.004, partial h2 ¼
0.27), which was due to higher activation in the object present
condition (M ¼ 0.05 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.03 mV) than in object absent
condition (M ¼ 20.07 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.02 mV). There was no
effect of study (F1,14¼ 0.01, p ¼ 0.92), and no interaction.
Next, we entered the activation during the false belief seg-
ment of study 2 in a two-way ANOVA with condition (object
occluded—false belief versus object absent—true belief) and
hemisphere (left versus right) as within-subjects factors.
There was a significant main effect of condition (F1,14 ¼ 8.47,
p ¼ 0.01, partial h2 ¼ 0.38) due to significantly higher
activation in the object occluded—false belief (M ¼ 0.07 mV,
s.e. ¼ 0.04 mV), compared with object absent—true belief con-
dition (M ¼ 20.01 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.05 mV; figure 4). There was no
main effect of hemisphere, and no interaction.
Finally, we analysed the late burst activation in the occlu-
sion from actor segment in the left hemisphere to test
whether our findings from study 1 were replicated. We ana-
lysed activation from the two studies with condition (object
present versus object absent) as within-subjects factor and
study (1 versus 2) as between-subjects factors. There was a
significant main effect of condition (F1,28¼ 7.97, p ¼ 0.01,
partial h2 ¼ 0.22), due to higher activation in the object present
(M ¼ 0.07 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.03 mV) than in object absent condition
(M ¼ 20.09 mV, s.e. ¼ 0.04 mV), and no main effect of study
(for detailed analysis in this late activation, see electronic
supplementary material, additional analyses).(c) Discussion
The results of study 2 are consistent with the proposal that
infants ascribe object representations to others not only
when they attribute true beliefs, but also when they can attri-
bute false beliefs to them. Similar to study 1, belief attribution
here was based on visual perspective taking (infants had
to encode that the object was not visible to the person).
Crucially, in the false belief segment, when the object disinte-
grated and this was visible to the infant but not to the person,
there was increased gamma-band activation, similarly to the
occlusion events (occlusion from the infant or from the
person).
These results suggest that infants encode that the other
person continues to represent the object, despite evidence
that prompts them to discard their own representation of
the very same object. Because disintegration has been pre-
viously shown not to trigger sustained object representation
[18], higher gamma activation during this event reflects that
the infants sustained the object representation they had attrib-
uted to the actor (who falsely believed the object to be behind
the occluder), even though this representation was in sharp
conflict with the infants’ own perception (as the object disin-
tegrated). Thus, the infants must have encoded that the other
person had seen the object being occluded, but did not see
the disintegration, and hence the attributed object represen-
tation could not be discarded on her behalf, but had to be
possibly refreshed and sustained further.
We see no obvious ways to explain the activation patterns
we observed in study 1 and 2 in terms of simpler cognitive
mechanisms that do not involve belief attributions. First, acti-
vation during occlusion from the actor only (occlusion from
actor segments in both studies) could not be due to infants’
own sustained representation because they continued to see
the object during this event. Second, our results cannot be
attributed to perceptual differences between the conditions
(e.g. that the object was present in one condition but not in
the other), because we subtracted the corresponding baseline
activation from our data where this difference already
existed, hence any activation difference due to this factor
would have been thus subtracted from the time window of
interest. Furthermore, results from the occlusion from actor
segment in study 2 excluded the possibility that the
gamma-band activation in the occlusion from actor segment
was due to infants’ expectation of occlusion from their own
perspective, as no such occlusion followed.
Additionally, results from study 2 confirm the late burst of
activation we found in study 1. This additional burst of acti-
vation therefore was present in both studies towards the end
of the occlusion from actor segment. During this period that fol-
lowed after the occlusion of the object from the actor, nothing
was happening in the video. Therefore, this activation probably
reflects computational processes that involve further processing
of the earlier observed events, possibly related to keeping in
mind the object representation attributed to the actor.4. General discussion
The goal of this paperwas to investigatewhether young infants
ascribe representations to others during tracking of what this
other person sees, knows or believes, through using their
own representational system that is otherwise used for encod-
ing objects and events in the world. In study 1, we presented
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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object and actor, and events where the infants’ or the other per-
son’s perceptual access to the object changed dynamically. In
study 2, we constructed a case where this event could lead to
a false belief about the presence of the object in the other
person. We recorded event-related oscillatory activity during
the observation of these events.
Earlier studies [18,19] found gamma-band oscillatory
activity in infants for sustained object representation. We
found similar gamma-band activations when an object
became occluded from the infants’ own (study 1, occlusion
from infant) or someone else’s perspective (studies 1 and 2,
occlusion from actor), consistent with the possibility that
there are shared underlying mechanisms for sustained
object representations for the self and for the ones attributed
to another person. Crucially, the activation found in response
to object occlusion from the other person’s perspective could
only be explained by the enrolment of an object represen-
tation ascribed to her. This is supported by the fact that
during this interval infants continued to perceive the object
and therefore did not need to sustain the representation for
themselves. Importantly, the same activation was observed
in a false belief situation where, after being occluded from
the actor, the infant saw the object disintegrating (study 2,
false belief segment). Due to disintegration the object
ceased to exist from the infant’s point of view; therefore,
EEG activation during this event is likely to be due to a sus-
tained object representation on behalf of the actor. Together,
the activations we found are indicative of the online proces-
sing of a representation that infants attribute to another
person based on her earlier perceptual access, specifically in
the form of a metarepresentation.
While we investigated here one kind of belief content
(beliefs about the presence of objects), based on an
approach arguing for shared mechanisms for infants’ own
representations and for attributed belief representations,
other kinds of belief contents should also activate the corre-
sponding cognitive systems in the observer’s mind and be
involved in operations on the ascribed belief representations.
Recent evidence suggests that adults show an increased N400
effect when they can infer that another person will have dif-
ficulty integrating a sentence due to a semantically
incongruous word (semantic violation) while they do not
perceive it as semantic violation, similar to the cases when
only they themselves perceive a semantic violation [20].
Our findings raise the question of how infants’ primary
representations would be separated from the representations
ascribed to others. While this study does not directly address
this question, we observed an additional burst of activation
that accompanied only processing the object occlusion from
the actor’s perspective, in both studies. The fact that similar
activation did not occur during the occlusion from the
infant events suggests that it might reflect some further pro-
cessing of ascribed representations, and could potentially
play a role in distinguishing an ascribed representation
from the infants’ own reality representation.
The finding that the cognitive systems that are otherwise
dedicated to representing objects are also involved in menta-
lizing processes points to the possibility that infants recruit
cognitive systems from outside of a hypothesized ToM net-
work [21] or ToM module [22] when representing others’
beliefs. Yet we do not take such data to speak to the question
that has repeatedly emerged with regard to ToM capacities,namely whether such reasoning is predominantly subserved
by domain-general or domain-specific processes [23]. The
gamma activations found in the ‘occlusion from actor’
events are most likely to signal sustaining an attributed rep-
resentation of an object. This process relates to the encoding
of the content of the actor’s belief, in other terms to the for-
mation of a metarepresentation of this belief content.
However, as this is probably one of the first steps in the pro-
cess of belief ascription [24], our findings leave open the
possibility that in the further steps of belief processing such
representations would serve as input to more specialized
mindreading processes.
Metarepresentations involving mental states were argued
to differ from other kinds of metarepresentations, for instance
from those of public representations (such as utterances) or
abstract representations, and there could be separate metare-
presentational competencies for each, as a distinct evolved
adaptation [13]. In line with this, behavioural evidence
suggests that adults process belief representations distinctly
from other metarepresentations that are not representations
of mental states (such as vignettes describing an event) [25].
Together, our studies demonstrate that preverbal infants
engage in encoding what others can and cannot see, and
their consequential beliefs. By possessing such powerful rep-
resentational capacities, infants are endowed with the ability
to ascribe to others any representations they themselves can
form, including representations that are in conflict with
their own representation of reality. One might wonder
whether these capacities are innate or are subject to change
during development. While this is a question for future
studies, it is possible that some basic ToM mechanisms
have an innate basis, although they probably require some
critical social experience.
Representing beliefs through forming metarepresenta-
tions of ascribed representations seems possible before the
onset of language. The fact that language might not be
necessary to form metarepresentations in belief reasoning
raises the possibility that similar cognitive processes could
be present in non-human animals. By the logic that cognitive
systems responsible to represent the physical world might be
‘re-used’ to represent others’ mental state contents, the ques-
tion emerges whether non-human animals could in some
situations metarepresent their conspecifics’ representations.
However, in the absence of empirical evidence, this question
remains a task for future research.
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